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Price Manipulation in Indonesian Capital Market:
Empirical Analysis on Stockbroker’s Behavior
and Interaction Pattern between Domestic Investors
and Foreign Investors
Buddi Wibowo*
Price manipulation in stock market transaction is an important issue when developing
investor confidence and market integrity is a priority. Price manipulation is prevalent in
emerging markets, which still have institutional problems and lack regulations. A stock
market as a mutual company has an institutional problem when a stock broker instead of
being an intermediary, behaves like a dealer and a principal for some stocks. A stock broker
has strong incentives to give a signal to public investors about price of some stocks in order
to get an unfair profit. A usual pattern of manipulation done by stock broker is a pump and
dump manipulation. Artificial price increase was made by manipulators through buying and
selling activities among themselves until tend chaser and naive investors jump to this game.
When stock price is at the highest level, manipulators start selling their stock. This research
measured and identified behavior pattern of stock brokers in Indonesian Stock Market,
concerning their contribution to price manipulation existence. Because of the important
role played by foreign investors in Indonesian stock market, this research would also identify
interaction pattern between foreign and domestic investors. Empirical researches showed
that foreign investors were underperformed domestic investors in Indonesian stock market
(Dvorak, 2005, and Agarwal et al. 2009). In spite of their superior experience and financial
support compared to domestic investosr, foreign investors got lower return on average.
Agarwal et al. (2009) showed this phenomenon occured because foreign investors were
more aggressive than domestic investors. Dvorak (2005) argued that domestic investors had
more access and network to collect short run information and were able to transfer those
information to profitable trading strategy. This research tested new hypothesis about foreign
investors’ underperformance, that those foreign investors were entrapped in manipulative
mechanism done by domestic investors having short run information through domestic
stockbroker companies.
Keywords: broker’s behavior, price manipulation, behavioral finance
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Introduction
Stock market manipulation is a kind of
deception through developing an artificial
stock price. This manipulative action is
usually done by some investors and brokers
who make artificial transactions among
themselves in order to increase stock price.
Naive investors who are attracted by this
increasing trend of the stock price will
follow this trend and make price increase
further. These naive investors will enter the
market until the price becomes so high that
the manipulators start selling the stocks.
Profit taking activities make the price
decrease until it reaches its real value. This
manipulative action is called as pump and
dump mechanism ( Allen dan Gale, 1992).
This market price manipulation usually
occurs at stock markets in developing
countries, which are not yet backed by
strong supervising institutions, systems,
and regulations. Zhou and Mei (2003) and
Khanna and Sunder (1999) found sources of
manipulative stock transaction in China dan
India were weaknesses of the supervising
institutions and market regulations.

Low market integrity has an implication
on public motivation to invest in capital
market. Market capitalization in developing
countries is relatively low compared to their
GDP. The number of public companies is
low and only few companies go public
every year. For example Indonesia’s ratio
stock market capitalization to GDP is
around 48%, far below the ratios of
Singapore and Australia, which is 334%
and 140% of their GDP respectively. Figure
1 shows market capitalization per capita
for some countries.
Institutional weakness in developing
countries is not surprising because most
of them have operated not very long.
Institutional building and market regulation
is a phase that developed countries, like
USA, have experienced before (Gordon,
2000). Manipulative practices, that had
destructed market integrity and investor
confidence, forced US Securities Act
in 1934, that was specially aimed at
eliminating those practices.
Khwaja dan Mian (2006) found that
manipulative action through pump and
dump mechanism mostly were done and

Figure 1. Global Stock Market Role

Source: Khwaja dan Mian (2006)
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Figure 2. Stock Market Demutualization Stages

Source: Aggarwal (2002)

backed up by stock brokers. Instead of
being an intermediary, they became a
principal of some stocks and influenced
those stock price formation processes for
their own interest.
In Indonesian capital market, like in
most emerging markets, stock brokers’
role in price formation process tends to
be significant because of weak market
structure and regulation. Most emerging
capital markets run as a mutual company so
that those markets were found to be owned
by pool of stock brokers. It is predominantly
broker-managed, i.e., a majority of the
exchange’s board of directors, including
the chairman, is brokers. Moreover, trading
on the stock exchange can be done only
through licensed brokers.
A stock broker has a conflict of interest
as a market player and also as an owner.
Indonesian Capital Market Act 1998 stated
that Indonesian capital market stocks
are only permitted to be owned by stock
brokers. International trend shows that
global capital markets have changed their
market ownerhip structure in order to
increase governance and market integrity.
External owners make the policy making
process in that capital market become
more transparant. 80 % stock exchanges
in the world have been demutualized.
Demutualization is an important stage
in capital market regime to decrease and
prohibit market manipulation. Figure 2
shows stages of demutualization process.
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Literature Review
The existing literature documents
mixed findings on the relative performance
of foreign and domestic investors. Grinblatt
and Keloharju(2000) and Seasholes (2004)
reported that foreign investors were better
traders, since they were better informed.
They found evidence that foreign investors
generally outperformed domestic investors.
Brennan and Cao (1997), Hau (2001),
Dvorˇa´k (2005), Choe, Kho,and Stulz
(2005), however, reported opposite findings.
Dvorˇa´k (2005) found that domestic
investors earned higher profits than foreign
investors in the Indonesian market. Choe,
Kho, and Stulz (2005) reported that foreign
investors paid more than domestic investors
for purchases and received less for sales in
the Korean market. After investigating the
underlying reasons for foreign investors’
poor performance, they found that foreign
investors traded at worse prices because
prices tended to move against them before
they traded, indicating the poor timing of
their trades. Even though Dvorˇ a´ k (2005)
and Choe, Kho, and Stulz (2005) agreed
that foreign investors’ trading performance
was inferior to that of domestic investors,
their explanation differed. Dvorˇa´k (2005)
attributed it to information disadvantage,
while Choe, Kho, and Stulz (2005) relied
on the poor timing of trades by foreign
investors. Based on a much longer study
period and more comprehensive data,
65
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Agarwal et al (2009) found that foreign
investors on the Jakarta Stock Exchange
(JSX) paid 9 basis points more than
domestic investors when they bought and
that they received 14 basis points less than
domestic investors when they sold. These
results confirm the findings by Choe,
Kho,andStulz(2005) and Dvorˇ a´ k (2005).
We
hypothesized
that
price
manipulations were done mostly by domestic
investors because of their relatively better
access to short term information. Foreign
investors’ underperformance was caused
by their lack of information concerning
which stocks were being manipulated by
domestic investors and domestic stock
brokers. Foreign investor were trapped in
pump and dump mechanism. They bought
stocks when stock brokers’ principalness to

buy index was high (LL state in Figure 3)
and sold stocks while the manipulators were
trying to dump those stocks (HL state).

Methodology
Price
manipulation
mechanism
identification in emerging market is a
challenging research. There are some
theoretical models that try to explain how
the manipulation works (Aggarwal dan Wu,
2006). The substantial broker influence
intimated and the concern by the market
regulatory body that ‘‘brokers mostly act
as principals and not as intermediaries’’
suggest that we should start by examining
trading patterns to see if this concern is
legitimate. More generally, we wanted to
identify any unusual trading patterns, and

Table 1. Principal and Intermediary Brokers Trading
Broker A (Intermediary)
PRIN=0.05
Trading Day
Shares Sold (1)
1
27,000
2
20,000
3
15,000
4
24,000
5
53,000
6
49,000
7
86,000
8
71,000
9
163,000
10
117,000
11
228,000
12
102,000
13
185,000
14
25,000
15
173,000
16
168,000
17
62,000
18
70,000
19
271,500
20
240,000

Shares Purchased
35,000
27,000
15,000
29,000
32,000
133,000
91,000
131,000
102,000
75,000
286,500
113,000
108,000
37,000
153,000
311,000
81,500
135,000
128,500
266,500

Broker B (Intermediary)
PRIN=1
Trading Day
Shares Sold (2)
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
...
...
1
50,000
2
0
3
50,000
4
0
5
50,000
6
0
7
50,000
8
5,000
9
0
...
...
1
100,000
2
10,000
3
25,000
4
625,000

Shares Purchased
25,000
20,000
50,000
10,000
68,000
...
0
50,000
0
50,000
0
50,000
0
5,000
50,000
...
0
0
0
0

The table gives a snapshot of our original data set. We provide 20 trades for two different brokers trading the same stock. Each
trade is at the day level, representing the total number of shares bought and sold by the broker during the entire day. The two brokers
have different trading patterns, which are representative of our data. The Broker in Column 1, (Broker A) is both buying and selling
the stock during the same day. We classify such a broker as an intermediary as he appears to be trading on behalf of a day. The broker
in Column 2, (Broker B), only buys or sells the stock on a given day. This suggest that the broker is trading only on his own behalf
or on a behalf of a single party. Broker B is clearly not intermediating on behalf of many outside investors. For this reason we define
Broker B as a principal. Whether a broker is a principal or not is captured by our “principalness” measure, PRIN, defined as the
probability (over time) that a given broker in a given stock will behave as a principal. A broker on a given day is said to behave as
a principal, if he does a buy transaction only or does a sale transaction only or buys and sells the same amount of a stock on a given
day. Using this definition, the PRIN values calculated for Brokers A and B are 0,05 and 1, respectively.
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Figure 3. Degree of Principalness & Pump and Dump Mechanism

Source: Khwaja and Mian (2006)

a suitable normality benchmark, given the
context, whether a broker is acting as an
intermediary for different outside investors.
We used the methodology that was
proposed by Kwaja and Mian (2006). Table
1 shows the methodology.
Supposed the three types of principal
trades identified in Table 1 signify that the
broker was trading on his own behalf that
day. The assumption that a principal trade
always reflects a broker trading on his own
behalf does not need to be true all the time.
All that we need is that principal trading
is correlated with a broker trading on his
own behalf. Then for each broker in a given
stock, we can compute the probability that
a broker will do a principal trade. This is
Khwaja and Mian’s (2006) measure PRIN.
The formula is as follows:
Number of times broker B
PRINSB= trades as a principal in stock S
Total number of times B trades
in stock S
(1)
The subscript SB is added to reiterate
that PRIN is constructed separately for
each broker B in every stock S. Thus, in our
example of Table 1, Broker A had a PRIN

Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2010

value of 0:05 for the 20 trades shown, 10
and Broker B, a PRIN value of 1.
Fig. 3 illustrates a stylized version of
this mechanism but one that we believed
reflects the reality reasonably well. We
first classified each stock-date with a state
variable IBIS, where IB and IS referred to
the overall PRIN categories of buyers and
sellers respectively trading the stock’s stock
on that date. For simplicity, let’s assume that
I can take a H(igh) or L(ow) value giving
four possible states for a given stock-date:
HH, LH, LL, and HL. The state variable LH
means that the average PRIN of the brokers
buying the stock’s stock on that day is low,
whereas the average PRIN of the brokers
selling the stock on that day is high. The
stylized mechanism works as follows. Start
at a point where prices are at their lowest
(point A). At this stage, manipulating
brokers (with high PRIN) trade back and
forth among themselves (the state at point
A is HHÞ to create artificial momentum and
price increases in the stock. This eventually
attracts outside investors with extrapolative
expectations (positive-feedback traders) to
start buying (branches B and C). However,
once the price has risen sufficiently, the
manipulators exit the market leaving only
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outsiders to trade amongst themselves
(point D). The state when price is at its
highest is thus LL. This artificially high
price cannot be sustained and eventually the
bubble bursts (branches E and F) and the
outside investors start selling. Once prices
are low enough, the manipulators can get
back into the market to buy back their stock
at low prices and potentially restart another
pump and dump cycle (point G). The above
mechanism is extremely stylized, and it is
unlikely that it can be continuously used.
Moreover, it relies on the existence of
momentum traders and assumes that groups
of brokers get together to manipulate prices
as opposed to an individual trader doing
so. However, because we were testing
this mechanism directly, this also implies

these assumptions were tested as well. The
mechanism implies that stock-date states
can be used.
Data
We used all daily transactions on all
stocks from all stock brokers in Bursa Efek
Indonesia (Indonesian Stock Exchange)
since January 2006 until Desember 2008.
Principalness to buy and to sell was
measured daily.

Result and Discussion
Before we tested the relationship
between principal index and foreign
transaction pattern, we needed to know the

Table 2. Price Difference Between LL and HH Principalness State
Grouping Category
Volume of Transaction (Rupiah)
Volume Transaction (share)
Number of Transaction
Return Volatility
Principalness Level

1
0,0731
(0.0155)*
0.0298
(0.1366)
0.0887
(0.0128)*
0.1477
(0.0000)*
0.0072
(0.3825)

2
0.0906
(0.0030)**
0.1136
(0.0002)**
0.1287
(0.0000)*
0.0641
(0.0447)*
0.0242
(0.1775)

3
0.1010
(0.0014)**
0.1001
(0.0003)**
0.0570
(0.0033)**
0.0705
(0.0095)**
0.0153
(0.2817)

Group (1 highest decile, 10 lowest decile)
4
5
6
7
0.0948
0.0515
0.0592
0.0594
(0.0000)* (0.0446)** (0.0001)* (0.0021)**
0.1302
0.0442
0.0748
0.0604
(0.0000)* (0.0149)* (0.0005)** (0.0046)**
0.1141
0.0552
0.0925
0.0598
(0.0001)* (0.0001)** (0.0002)** (0.0029)**
0.0416
0.0970
0.0693
0.0729
(0.0449)* (0.0019)** (0.0007)* (0.0001)*
0.0400
0.0734
0.0824
0.0759
(0.0148)* (0.0001)** (0.0002)** (0.0016)**

8
0.0642
(0.0034)**
0.0469
(0.0104)**
0.0480
(0.0001)*
0.0122
(0.2347)
0.1167
(0.0000)**

9
0.0348
(0.0956)
0.0424
(0.0271)*
0.0025
(0.4615)
0.0762
(0.0014)*
0.1143
(0.0005)*

10
0.0136
(0.3395)
(0.0015)
(0.4825)
(0.0062)
(0.4260)
(0.0042)
(0.2681)
0.0920
(0.0050)*

Figure 4. Price Difference between LL and HH Principalness State
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existence of pump and dump mechanism.
This manipulative mechanism exists if
there are price difference between LL and
HH stage. Groups of stocks were classified
according to their volume of transactions,
number of transaction, return volatility, and
principal index. We found price difference

was significant in almost all category. We
concluded that pump and dump mechanism
existed in Indonesian Capital Market. Table
2 shows the result.
We also tested whether one could make
profit by buying at HH state and selling
at LL state. The result proved that the

Table 3. Buy Stock at Principalness Strategy
1 Week
Holding Period Return
Annualized Return
p Value

2 Week
2.96%
15.74%

0.0000

0.0000

Holding Period
3 Week
1.83%
9.47%
0.0000

4 Week
1.38%
7.08%

0.21%
1.03%
0.0000

Figure 5. State Trading Return

Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2010

69

7

The Indonesian Capital Market Review, Vol. 2, No. 1 [2010], Art. 5

INDONESIAN CAPITAL MARKET REVIEW

•

VOL.II

• NO.1

Table 4. Foreign Transaction Volume Difference Between LL and HH
Principalness State
Group
Category

Volume of Transaction
(Rupiah)
Volume of Transaction
(number of share)
Number of
Transaction
Degree of
Principalness

All Data
0.0414
(0.1560)
0.0414
(0.1560)
0.0414
(0.1560)
0.0414
(0.1560)

1
0.0717
(0.2287)
0.1143
(0.1797)
0.1047
(0.1397)
(0.1524)
(0.1382)

2

3

0.0086
(0.4686)
0.1934
(0.0307)*
0.1810
(0.0519)
(0.1198)
(0.1211)

0.2508
(0.0053)**
0.1405
(0.1432)
0.2301
(0.0516)
0.0922
(0.2257)

hypothesis was true. Buying stock at HH
state and selling 1 week later gave 2,96%
return, and decrease until 4 week. Table 3
and Figure 5 show the result.
To test whether foreign investors were
entrapped in pump and dump mechanism,
we tested significance of volume difference
between foreign buying transaction and
foreign selling transaction in the state of
LL. If foreign investors were entrapped,
the volume of their buying transaction
was much higher than that of their selling
transaction in state of LL. The result was
that foreign investors’ buying transaction
was, on average, 4,14 % higher than their
selling transaction for one week holding
period but it was not significant ( p value =
15,6% ). For robustness test, we classified
the data by the degree of principalness and
formed ten groups. We found that for all
ten groups it seemed that foreign investors
tended to buy more but most of them were
not significant (level of error 5%). We could

Group (1 highest, 10 lowest)
4
5
6
(0.0344)
0.3497
(0.2211)
(0.3851)
(0.0204)*
(0.0793)
(0.1690)
0.0584
0.0832
(0.1879)
(0.3628)
(0.2446)
0.0727
(0.0241)
0.0186
(0.3571)
(0.4459)
(0.4458)
0.0210
0.1041
(0.0815)
(0.4545)
(0.1208)
(0.2454)

7
0.1663
(0.1659)
0.1604
(0.0906)
0.0476
(0.3464)
0.2079
(0.0693)

8
(0.1314)
(0.2398)
0.0022
(0.4921)
(0.0453)
(0.3149)
0.0440
(0.3898)

9
(0.0271)
(0.3692)
(0.1127)
(0.2230)
(0.1693)
(0.1280)
0.1989
0.0772

10
(0.0178)
(0.3408)
(0.0505)
(0.1299)
0.0316
(0.0776)
0.1105
(0.1390)

conclude that foreign investors were not
entrapped in a pump and dump mechanism.

Conclusion
There were indications that pump and
dump mechanism existed in Indonesian
stock market. Using Khwaja and Mian
(2006) manipulation definition and
measurement, we found that pump and
dump mechanism occurred for around 4
weeks, from HH state that was when
principal brokers started to pump stock
price until HL state, that was when those
brokers sold systematically their stocks.
This mechanism gave profit to the brokers
around 2.96% (15.74%, annualized). We
also found that foreign investors were not
entrapped in this manipulative mechanism.
Even though we found that foreign
investors’ net buying was relatively high
around the LL state, it was not statistically
significant.
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